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Subject: Overview of the MCNP6® SQA Plan and Requirements

General Overview

Monte Carlo Codes, XCP-3

X Computational Physics Division

For all X Computational Physics Division (XCP) software under the Associate Laboratory Directorate for Weapons Physics (ALDX), the Weapons Research Services Secure Networks and Assurance Group (WRS-SNA) manages the software quality assurance (SQA) plan, requirements and guidance with respect to development processes and tools to meet the broader LANL SQA requirements. Each XCP software product is categorized into one of three software types: Safety Software, Non-Safety Risk Significant Software, and Non-Safety Commercially Controlled Software. Within ALDX, all software that is

- categorized as Safety Software and Non-Safety Risk Significant Software, the LANL P1040 *Software Quality Management* plan is followed;
- categorized as Non-Safety Commercially Controlled Software, the WRS-SNA WRS-AD-0010U *Software Quality Assurance Program Plan* is followed, which derives from the LANL P1040 *Software Quality Management* plan.

Additionally, WRS-AD-0010U identifies Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) as its standard. The NNSA NAP-24A *Weapon Quality Policy* requires that a standard be selected, and at LANL, the IEEE software engineering standard is preferred.

P1040 is derived from the LANL SD330 *Los Alamos National Laboratory Quality Assurance Program*, and subsequently the DOE O 414.1D *Quality Assurance* order. Figure 1 describes the SQA flow-down that ultimately applies to the SQA plan and procedures within LANL's ALDX. Figure 2 defines the required procedure for each software product developed and maintained in the ALDX with the required procedure dependent on software categorization.

LANL Form 2033 Safety/Non-Safety Software Determination, Categorization, and Software Risk Level (SRL) is used to determine the software categorization. In the case where the software is categorized as Non-Safety Commercially Controlled Software, WRS-FORM-0001U ADX Software Impact Grading From is then used to determine whether it is High, Medium or Low



Impact. This grading determines which components within the WRS-AD-0010U SQA plan are required to be followed.

¹MCNP6[®] Categorization and Grading

In 2018, using LANL Form 2033, the MCNP6 code was categorized by the XCP division as **Non-Safety Commercially Controlled Software**, provided in Appendix A. Using WRS-FORM-0001U, the MCNP6 code was graded as a **Medium Impact** software product, provided in Appendix B.

Given these determinations, the WRS-AD-0010U SQA plan is followed for all MCNP6 developments, documentation and code releases (see highlighted boxes in Figures 1 and 2).

For the applications and uses of versions of the MCNP6 code that are developed and released by the Monte Carlo Codes group (XCP-3), the MCNP6 code is not controlled for and should not be used for safety significant applications unless qualified to do so by individual users of the code for their specific areas of application.




Figure 1. SQA Documents

¹ MCNP[®] and Monte Carlo N-Particle[®] are registered trademarks owned by Triad National Security, LLC, manager and operator of Los Alamos National Laboratory. Any third-party use of such registered marks should be properly attributed to Triad National Security, LLC, including the use of the ® designation as appropriate. For the purposes of visual clarity, the registered trademark symbol is assumed for all references to MCNP within the remainder of this document.



	Procedural Scope b	y Softwar	е Туре	
Safety Software	Non-Safety Risk Significant Software		Non-Safety <i>cially Controlled S</i> all ALDX in-scope	-
Fol	low P1040		Medium Impact low WRS-AD-001	-

Figure 2. SQA Plan Requirements Process

Recommendations for Users of the MCNP6 Code for Safety and/or Risk Significant Applications

The general purpose MCNP6 particle transport code can be used for many applications including but not limited to radiation protection and dosimetry, radiation shielding, radiography, medical physics, nuclear criticality safety, detector design and analysis, nuclear oil well logging, accelerator target design, fission and fusion reactor design, and nuclear decontamination and decommissioning. It would unreasonable for the code development team to develop the code under the strict ASME NQA-1-2008 (NQA-1) *Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications* documented standards for all of these application areas. More importantly, this would be unusable by all users of the code given that **all users must qualify their version of the MCNP6 code and data for their particular uses and applications**. Specifically, for LANL users the MCNP6 code usage needs to follow the LANL P1040 *Software Quality Management* process if it will be used in safety and/or risk significant applications. For other users and institutions, the requirements may vary based on how each institution chooses to follow the NQA-1 and other international standards.

As part of the qualification of the MCNP6 code for specific applications, it is recommended and may be required that a suite of qualification tests be developed to cover the application areas of interest. Within the XCP-3 Monte Carlo Codes group, throughout the development of MCNP6 features and code improvements, extensive testing is routinely performed. Verification and validation (V&V) tests provided and documented with the MCNP6 code, covering criticality, shielding and many other physical capabilities, may be relevant and useful to supplement or fulfill user-specific qualification testing for a limited set of application areas. As an example, version 6.2 of MCNP includes several developer curated V&V test suites, with results documented in "MCNP6.2.0 Release Testing", <u>LA-UR-17-29011</u> (2017).

In addition to these qualification tests, which may need to be exercised on a regularly occurring basis defined in the user-specific SQA plan, access control mechanisms over the MCNP6 code, executable, and all necessary data files required to execute the code must be in place to ensure the qualified code and data are not altered in any fashion. This may include the use of access control mechanisms to ensure that the MCNP executable cannot be modified, the use of



checksums to ensure that the executable has not been modified, and the use of in-use tests to ensure that neither the MCNP6 executable nor any operating system libraries have been detrimentally modified. The end user should be cognizant of the system libraries for which the MCNP6 code depends and any changes to such system libraries should be tracked. Additional strict access/change control to the system libraries may be necessary as well.

In order to qualify the MCNP6 code for a specific application use, it is possible the user will need to go through the commercial grade dedication process if their application falls in a safety or risk significant application area.

Specifically, <u>for nuclear criticality safety applications</u>, where MCNP6 is frequently used in a more safety/risk significant application area, DOE-STD-3007-2017 *Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities* states:

Calculational techniques may be hand calculation methods or computer-based neutron transport calculations. The neutron transport computer code systems listed below are developed and maintained through rigorous expert review of neutron transport theory, cross section data, and Monte Carlo methods in accordance with DOE software quality assurance requirements. These code systems are distributed by the Radiation Safety Information Computational Center at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The following code systems are accepted programs for use in NCS applications when used in accordance with a site-specific software quality assurance program for classifying and controlling software:

- SCALE: A Comprehensive Modeling and Simulation Suite for Nuclear Safety Analysis and Design
- MCNP[®]: Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code System
- COG: Multiparticle Monte Carlo Code System for Shielding and Criticality Use

All pertinent calculational results shall be reported. Where referenced calculations or reports are used to support the results of the evaluation, a summary of the referenced calculations should be included. Plots of data should be clearly labeled. Descriptions/labels of individual computer runs should indicate the physical attributes of the system being analyzed. Estimated uncertainties in the results (e.g., statistical uncertainties associated with Monte Carlo calculations) and analyzed sensitivities to modeling simplifications that are not bounding (e.g., effects of homogenization, dimension or geometry modifications) should be included here as well.

Regardless of this statement in DOE-STD-3007-2017, which may allow these specific users to bypass the commercial grade dedication process, each nuclear criticality safety site must validate the MCNP6 code and data with benchmarks which cover their area(s) of application. Additionally, they must have their own SQA plan for qualification testing with access control mechanisms in place to protect the code and data from detrimental changes.



Acronyms

ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
DOE	Department of Energy
NNSA	National Nuclear Security Administration
LANL	Los Alamos National Laboratory
ALDX	Associate Laboratory Directorate for Weapons Physics (within LANL)
ХСР	X Computational Physics Division (within ALDX)
XCP-3	Monte Carlo Codes Group (within XCP)
WRS	Weapons Research Services Division (within ALDX)
WRS-SNA	Secure Networks and Assurance Group (within WRS)

References

P1040	LANL	Software Quality Management
WRS-AD-0010U	ALDX	Software Quality Assurance Program Plan
NAP-24A	NNSA	Weapon Quality Policy
SD330	LANL	Los Alamos National Laboratory Quality Assurance Program
DOE O 414.1D	DOE	Quality Assurance
Form 2033	LANL	Safety/Non-Safety Software Determination, Categorization, and Software Risk Level (SRL)
WRS-FORM-0001U	ALDX	ADX Software Impact Grading From
ASME NQA-1-2008	ASME	<i>Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility</i> <i>Applications</i>
DOE-STD-3007-2017	DOE	Preparing Criticality Safety Evaluations at Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities

MER:mer

Distribution:

MCNP Website, mcnp.lanl.gov

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Appendix A


2018 MCNP6, Form 2033 (4 pages)

6	Reference No:		Form 20
I os Alamo)C	The Software Owner RLM must re	tain completed forms as a reco
NATIONAL LABORATO	Safety/Non-Sat	ety Software Determination Soft	on, Categorization, ai tware Risk Level (SR (See Page 5 for Guidan
Part 1: Document the rationa significant software.	le supporting the reasonable pro	bability that the software may be s	afety software, or risk
indicate whether the softw a nuclear (including r an accelerator, live-fi facility as determined X LANL's Essential Fur Provide supporting comme ADX COOP, ADX.18-010, ident	rare is or will be used in connection adiological) facility (Ref. LANL Nuc ring range, biological hazard facility lusing <u>SBP111-1</u> , <i>Facility Hazard</i> actions as described in <u>SEO-COOF</u> ents (as necessary to document the	le calculation output (e.g., e-mail soft with the design, analysis and/or ope lear Facility List. Conduct of Operatio r, high explosive facility, or moderate- categorization and Documentation, or 2006, LANL COOP [Continuity of Operation] selection above). ing records of essential functions who	ration of: <u>ns Resources Website</u>), or or high- chemical hazard r erations] Plan.
	re information, software applicat n or one form may be used for m	on(s) and software function(s). A s	eparate form may be used
2.1 Provide software name(s). MCNP		2.3 Indicate software owner (SO). Avneet Sood	2.4 Indicate SO organization XCP-3
point(s) of application with		ufficient detail to allow the software to a (TA) and building number; or, site-w n as required.	
	ment(s) of the software associated		
Provide supporting comments (a	as required).		
2.7 Indicate facility classificati NA	on (<u>SBP111-1)</u> , design, or analysis	controlled or affected by the software	e. Indicate NA if not applicabl
2.7.1 Provide facility classificati			
		e facility classification, design or ana	lysis.
2.7.3 Provide reference docume Provide supporting comments (a	ent(s) describing the facility classific	ation, design, or analysis.	
Form 2033 (5/16)			Page

XCP-3:20-008, LA-UR-20-26666 To Distribution

2.8 Indicate	the hazard control, Safety Management Program (SMP) and or technical safety requirements (TSRs) controlled or
affected	by the software. Indicate NA if not applicable.
NA 2.8.1 Brouida	the hazard control, SMP and/or TSR name.
2.0.1 FIOVIDE	une nazaru controi, sime anu/or risk name.
2.8.2 Provide	the software functional requirement(s) for the hazard control, SMP and/or TSR.
283 Provide	reference document(s) describing the hazard control, SMP and/or TSR.
2.0.0 1101100	
Provide suppo	rting comments (as required).
Part 3: Determ each t	nine whether the software type is (1) safety software; or (2) non-safety software and the associated category for ype.
3.1 Check on	e of the following (3.1.1 through 3.1.5) to determine one of the two software types (safety software or non-safety
	and one of the associated 5 categories for each type (i.e. Categories include SSS, SHADS or SMACS for safety and, Risk Significant or Commercially Controlled for non-safety software).
	re is determined to be safety software or risk significant software, complete all parts of this form. If software is
determined to	be commercially controlled software, complete all parts of this form except for Part 4.
3.1.1 Safety	This is software for a nuclear (including radiological) facility that performs, or will perform a safety function as part of a Structure, System, and Component (SSC) and is cited in either (a) a Department of Energy (DOE)-approved
software: SSS	documented safety analysis; or, (b) an approved hazard analysis per DOE P 450.4A, Integrated Safety Management Policy and <u>48 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 970-5223-1</u> , Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into
	Work Planning and Execution. This is safety software and is categorized as Safety System Software (SSS).
	Provide supporting comments (as required).
3.1.2	This is software that is used, or will be used to classify, design, or analyze nuclear (including radiological) facilities. This
Safety software:	software is not part of an SSC, but helps to ensure the proper accident or hazards analysis of nuclear (including radiological) facilities or an SSC that performs a safety function. This is safety software and is categorized as Safety
SHADS	and Hazard Analysis Software and Design Software (SHADS).
	Provide supporting comments (as required).
3.1.3	This is software that performs or will perform a hazard control function in support of nuclear (including radiological) facility radiological safety management programs (SMPs) or technical safety requirements (TSRs).
Safety software:	This is safety software and is categorized as Safety Management and Administrative Controls Software (SMACS).
SMACS	Provide supporting comments (as required).
	r toride supporting contribute (de required).
	This is software that performs, or will perform a control function in support of a nuclear (including radiological)
	facility necessary to provide adequate protection from nuclear (including radiological) facility radiological hazards.
	It supports eliminating, limiting, or mitigating nuclear hazards to workers, the public, or the environment as addressed in <u>10 CFR 830</u> , <i>Nuclear Safety Management</i> , <u>10 CFR 835</u> , <i>Occupational Radiation Protection</i> , and the
	Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation (DEAR) Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) clause 48 CER 970.5223-1, Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Work Planning and Execution. This is safety
	software and is categorized as Safety Management and Administrative Controls Software (SMACS).
	Provide supporting comments (as required).
3.1.4	This is software that is, or will be used for any of the purposes that safety software is used for only such purposes are in or for an accelerator, live-firing range, biological hazard facility, high explosive facility, or moderate- or high- chemical
Non-safety software: Risk	hazard facility OR, failure of the software would <u>prevent</u> LANL from performing Essential Functions as described in <u>SEO-COOP-006</u> , LANL COOP [Continuity of Operations] Plan. This is non-safety software and is categorized as Risk
Significant	Second software.
	Provide supporting comments (as required).







and as a Manager	oftware Owner (SO), I have determined the software type, category, ppropriate, SRL, in accordance with <u>P1040</u> , Software Quality ment and the instructions associated with this form.	signature Avneet Sood	Digitally signed by Avneet Sood DR c-US, o-US, Government, sour Department of Enropy, oo-Loo Amors National Laborator, our Poople, serialNumber-150745, or -Avneet Sod	Date
	Name/Z No. (print). Avneet Sood/150745		Dute 2018.06.21 13:48:44 -06'00'	
have rev and, as	oftware Owner Responsible Line Manager (SO RLM or SRLM), I riewed and approve the determination of the software type, category appropriate, SRL for the software as described on this form. Name/Z No. (print). Avneet Sood/150745	signature Avneet Sood	Digitally signed by Avneet Soad DN: c+US, c+US, Government, our-Department of Energy, coultos Alamos National Laboratory, our-Propie, senativumber-150745, cm-Avneet Soad Date: 2018.06.21 13.49:0005'00'	Date
represe ⊠ Re: determ the sof Provid Note: The R/ FDAR or DA,	☐ Facility Design Authority Representative (FDAR) for my entative facilities, as the ☐ LANL Design Authority (DA), or, as the sponsible Associate Director (RAD), I have reviewed and approve the initation of the software type, category and, as appropriate, SRL for tware as described on this form. Check one. e Name/Z No. (print). Michael Bernardin/099579 AD is authorized to review and approve Form 2033 (rather than the or DA) for software applications where, as determined by the FDAR the FDAR or DA does not have the knowledge and/or a reasonable	Signature	lull	Date
Supporting Con	tion to the software.	number that corres	ponds to the comm	ents.
Supporting Con	nments Continuation Page	number that corres	ponds to the comm	ents.
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Appendix B

2018 MCNP, WRS-FORM-0001U (2 pages)

ADX Software	Impact G	irading Form		WRS-FORM-000 Revision Page 1 o
Section 1: Soft 1.1 Software Name or Code Family:	ware Info MCNP	ormation	(ca bla	Version In be Ink if Ing Code
1.3 Software I			Fa	mily):
Softwar Signific	re does no c ant Softv re may hav	Probability (select of t have the reasonable vare (refer to P1040) ve reasonable probab o P1040). Complete	probability of being ility of being Safety	or Risk Significant
Softwar Signific Softwar Softwa Section 3: Scot	re does no c ant Softv re may hav re (refer t r ing	t have the reasonable vare (refer to <u>P1040)</u> ve reasonable probab o <u>P1040)</u> . Complete	probability of being ility of being Safety Form 2033 and subr	or Risk Significant hit as a record.
☐ Softwan Signific Softwan Softwa Section 3: Scot Factors/S 3.1 Consequence	re does no c ant Softv re may hav re (refer t r ing	t have the reasonable vare (refer to <u>P1040</u>) ve reasonable probab	probability of being ility of being Safety	or Risk Significant
Softwar Signific Softwar Softwar Softwar Section 3: Scor Factors/S	re does no cant Softv re may hav re (refer t ring core	t have the reasonable vare (refer to P1040) ve reasonable probab o P1040). Complete 1 Unlikely or implausible safety, security or environmental	e probability of being ility of being Safety Form 2033 and subr 2 Minimal safety, environmental or	or Risk Significant nit as a record. 3 Severe injury, illness or death; permanent environmental damage or a security

Released: 6/18/18



ADX Software	Impact Grading	form	WR	5-FORM-0001U Revision B Page 2 of 4
Facto	rs/Score	1	2	3
	3.2.1 New Designed	Low to minimal complexity, few to no interfaces or separate code modules.	Moderately Complex, multiple code modules and algorithms and interfaces.	Highly complex system: numerous code modules, algorithms, interfaces, interconnection of subsystems and support software.
3.2 Complexity Of Software (select one from the row of software category)	3.2.2 Commercial Off the Shelf Software (COTS)	Low complexity; has minimal features or requirements; Validation is not difficult; could be accomplished using calibration certificates or vendor provided test cases.	Moderately complex with multiple modules and features; Test cases are moderately complex; validation could be accomplished using test cases provided by the vendor along with expert judgment and/or calculations.	Highly complex specification; numerous code modules, algorithms, interfaces and support software. Test cases are complex; requires significant calculations or expert judgment to validate output.
	3.2.3 In-use Software	Successfully tested, proven software solution and no modifications intended.	Moderately Complex, minimal modifications, software is stable, and multiple stakeholders.	Highly complex system, frequent modifications, and multiple stakeholders.
Section 4:	Low Impact (1-61 / Medium	3.3 Total Sum: Impact (7-9)	9 Impact (10-12)
Impact Level Section 5: Appr				
Software Owne	r 1 L	Sand	Date	Z number 150745
AVNEET Soc Software RLM	D AND	20059	16 JULY 2018 Date	Znumber
	eblig		8/2/18	118467

